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Summary 
This paper explores the concept of autonomy as it might apply to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people. Literature dealing with the concept of autonomy is 
considered and several analytical approaches are discussed. Principal amongst 
these are the distinction between corporate autonomy for a people and regional 
autonomy, whether autonomy might apply to only Indigenous people or to all 
people in a region, and the possible relationship between political and economic 
factors. Although autonomy may be considered as a right, the paper takes the 
view that it is a status which has to be negotiated with the state, and so requires 
legitimation. 
With these principles in mind, the concept of autonomy is discussed at the 
national level and in four regions: Torres Strait, the Tiwi Islands, the Miwatj 
region in Arnhem Land, and the Murdi Paaki ATSIC region in New South Wales. 
These examples suggest that Indigenous people perceive autonomy as something 
that would apply to largely to Indigenous-specific services; only in Torres Strait is 
consideration being given to a form of regional autonomy that might apply to 
issues relating to all of the people in the region. The example of Murdi Paaki in 
New South Wales suggests that in the more heavily populated regions of the 
country Indigenous people may well view autonomy in terms of devolving more 
economic power to the regions within the ambit of the ATSIC system. 
In general, the examples suggest that Indigenous views of economic autonomy 
include increased control over Indigenous-specific funding. The only exception to 
this is in Torres Strait where one goal is greater Indigenous control of local 
fisheries. There is a significant point of divergence between Indigenous and 
government views of the economic aspects of autonomy, with governments 
considering political autonomy as something that might result in a reduction in 
welfare costs either through greater regional efficiencies or through increased 
Indigenous participation in the market economy. 
The paper suggests that the concepts of negative and positive autonomy may be 
useful in the Australia context as they may help illustrate that a particular form 
of autonomy is possible even when there is continuing economic dependence on 
the welfare system. 
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Introduction 
In their final report the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) proposed a bill 
to advance the process of reconciliation. In this it was suggested that an 
unresolved issue for reconciliation is ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-
government and regional autonomy’ (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 2000: 
177). Similarly, in their 2000 report the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission (HREOC) argued that ‘[t]he development of governance structures 
and regional autonomy provides the potential for a successful meeting place to 
integrate the various strands of reconciliation’ (Jonas 2000: 85). References over 
the years to autonomy for Indigenous people are found primarily in academic 
works (see for example Coombs 1993; Tonkinson & Howard 1990). The term 
appears to have originated at a policy level with respect to Torres Strait Islanders 
when Fisk, commenting on community government in the Strait in 1974 said: 
The Torres Strait Islander Act of Queensland, in the isolation of the island 
environment has produced a system of government entirely different from that to 
which most mainland Australians, including Queenslanders, are accustomed. And 
one in which a quite remarkable level of autonomy has been achieved (Fisk 1974: 3). 
Autonomy for Torres Strait Islanders was also the focus of a parliamentary 
inquiry (henceforth the Inquiry) and a subsequent report (House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs (HORSCATSIA) 1997) entitled Torres Strait Islanders: A New Deal 
(henceforth: New Deal). This Inquiry and events surrounding it have been the 
subject of several pieces of research (see Sanders 2000; Sanders & Arthur 2001). 
In addition to this, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 
has explored how the notion of autonomy might apply to Indigenous people on 
the mainland of Australia (see ATSIC 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999; Djerrkura, Bedford 
& Williams 2000). However, though autonomy has at times been equated with the 
notion of self-determination (see ATSIC 1995: 24, 25) it has not been subject to a 
great deal of analysis in this context and its meaning has remained unclear.  
This paper aims to redress this by first discussing some conceptual issues 
associated with autonomy and then by applying these to Torres Strait, to the Tiwi 
Islands and Miwatj in the Northern Territory, and to the Murdi Paaki region in 
New South Wales.1 
Approaches to autonomy 
Despite the fact that it has been used by the United Nations since 1945, the 
concept of autonomy has no standing in international law (Hannum & Lillich 
1981: 215, 249). It has no reliable theoretical base and international and regional 
examples tell us little about its content and structure (Ghai 2000: 3, 4, 21). 
Possibly for these reasons it has remained a broad and problematic term which 
has come to mean different things to different people, a concept with many 
conceptions (Dworkin 1988: 5–6, 9; Ghai 2000: 1) or, a concept that is variably 
realised in different times, places and situations (Tonkinson & Howard 1990: 68). 
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On the one hand these characteristics can be advantageous as they allow for 
some political manoeuvring and for a variety of political structures, but on the 
other hand they make autonomy a difficult concept to pin down and to 
operationalise (Hannum & Lillich 1981: 215, 249, 253). 
Although some have argued that autonomy can imply sovereignty and political 
independence (Fleras 1999: 224) there seems more general acceptance that it 
implies a continuing political and economic connection with a larger state 
(Hannum & Lillich 1981: 216–18, 249; Sohn 1988: 5). While not representing 
total independence, autonomy is generally associated with power relationships 
and is concerned with who controls what (Fleras 1999: 189); though it is usually 
about degrees rather than any fixed or pre-defined level of control (Hannum & 
Lillich 1981: 249). Thus, autonomy is not an absolute but a relative status 
(Stavenhagen 1994: 27; Tonkinson & Howard 1990: 68) opening up the possibility 
of power-sharing and of ‘internal self-government’ within a state (Ghai 2000: 1–2; 
Hannum & Lillich 1981). 
Negotiation and legitimation 
It is possible to view autonomy as a right (Watts 2000: 37).2 ATSIC has referred to 
‘autonomy rights’ as the right of indigenous peoples to determine the way in 
which they live and control their social, economic and political development 
(ATSIC 1995: 24) and a rights approach is a central aspect of ATSIC’s current 
corporate plan (ATSIC 2001: 2).3 In the case of Indigenous people who have been 
colonised, this could represent the return of a status that they had lost during the 
process of colonisation. However, no matter how morally valid such an approach 
might be, it does not necessarily make the concept much clearer or lead to 
strategies and practical outcomes. 
In any event others take an alternative view, namely that autonomy cannot 
necessarily be considered as a right but rather as something which has to be 
negotiated with the state (Fleras 1999: 195; Australia Law Reform Commission 
1986).4 For instance, although autonomy for indigenous Canadians is part of 
government policy, the Inuit had to negotiate with the Canadian Government over 
each of the powers that made up the self-government of Nunavut (Fleras & Elliott 
1992: 48). It would seem therefore that if autonomy is about negotiating levels of 
power and control, then each of the parties concerned, for example the state and 
indigenous people, will be required to legitimise their negotiating position (Fleras 
1999: 190). That is to say, they will each need to make a case for either gaining or 
for retaining power and it is likely that their ability to do this will depend on their 
circumstances (Australia Institute 2000: v; Ghai & Regan 2000: 242). 
To whom might autonomy apply? 
It is necessary to consider to whom autonomy might apply, as this will influence 
what it might include (see Sanders & Arthur 2001). For instance, if it is to apply 
only to Indigenous Australians then it may only involve those programs and funds 
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specifically earmarked for them. If, on the other hand, it is to apply to all people 
in a region, then it would be likely to include rather more elements and resources. 
Although autonomy was originally a concept applying to individuals, it is now 
often used with reference to groups (Dworkin 1988: 164; Hannum & Lillich 1981: 
248). Indigenous people can be considered as one group or ‘one people’.5 They do 
however also form smaller groupings according to criteria such as language, 
community of residence, or kinship and family. Though they may seek autonomy 
at these various levels, there can be considerable tension amongst them over who 
should control what (Martin 2001; Martin & Finlayson 1996). The focus of this 
paper is autonomy as it might apply to a whole people, and to regions. 
Corporate autonomy (for a people) 
Autonomy that might apply to a specific group nationally, that is to say, across a 
whole country, has been described as autonomy for a people, or as ‘corporate 
autonomy’ (Ghai 2000: 8, 9, 12; Hannum & Lillich 1981: 253; Sanders & Arthur 
2001; Watts 2000: 40). Corporate autonomy may apply when a group can show 
that they have special needs nationally, with respect to the provision of certain 
services such as health or housing. 
This kind of autonomy already applies to an extent in Australia. For example 
there are Aboriginal medical services, legal services and housing co-operatives. 
Indeed, ATSIC itself can be said to represent this form of autonomy as it receives 
and administers funds for national Indigenous-specific programs. These include 
programs for business development, land and native title, law and justice, 
women’s issues, home ownership, and housing and infrastructure. To increase 
this form of autonomy, ATSIC would have to negotiate with the Commonwealth 
Government for more control of these funds, or for control of a wider range of 
Indigenous-specific services. This would run counter to a recent trend which has 
seen the Federal Liberal and Country Party Coalition Government reduce ATSIC’s 
autonomy by, for example, transferring responsibility for health from ATSIC to the 
Commonwealth Department for Health and Family Services. 
Although ATSIC can be considered as one manifestation of corporate autonomy, 
another might be greater or special political representation. It has been suggested 
that this could be achieved through reserved seats in parliament, possibly 
following the New Zealand example with respect to Maori.6 ATSIC has proposed 
that: ‘The Commonwealth Government should investigate the possibility of 
reserved seats in the Australian Parliament by commissioning a report on how 
this can be achieved’ (ATSIC 1995: 50).7 
However, such a proposal would also need to clarify the scope of this form of 
representation. For instance, would the role of such representatives be to discuss 
all of the affairs of parliament, or only those relating specifically to Indigenous 
people? ATSIC has proposed that (as an interim stage towards reserved 
representation) their Chair should have observer status in parliament with the 
ability to ‘speak to either house on Bills affecting Indigenous interests’ (ATSIC 
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1995: 51; emphasis added). This suggests that a form of corporate autonomy 
based on reserved representation might only apply to Indigenous-specific issues. 
Another possible device for furthering Indigenous corporate autonomy might be 
for a body of Indigenous representatives to sit alongside, and work in parallel 
with, mainstream governments. Examples of this are the Sami parliaments of 
Norway, Sweden and Finland (Craig & Freeland 1999). However, the powers of 
these Indigenous parliaments are largely limited to providing advice to their 
national parliaments on issues and finances applying specifically to the Sami (see 
Craig & Freeland 1999). 
Fig. 1 The Indigenous population by ATSIC Region, 1996 
Source: ABS Census, 1996
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Another form of the above might be a bicameral system where Indigenous 
representatives make up a separate house or chamber located within the national 
parliament.8 Such a system might be described as ‘cultural bicameralism’ in as 
much as it would be a dual system of representation, one part of which was 
restricted to a specific cultural group such as elders or traditional land owners.9 
Forms of cultural bicameralism can be found in the South Pacific, for example in 
the Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji. An issue would be whether these 
representatives are democratically elected or selected in some way. It is unclear 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 220 5 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
what proportion of Indigenous people might favour giving power to groups with a 
culturally-based status. 
Indigenous people also access services from mainstream public providers. If we 
equate autonomy with control of these services, Indigenous autonomy could be 
increased by moving the relevant resources from the mainstream to an 
Indigenous-specific stream. However, studies have shown that it is very difficult 
to separately identify what these resources might be (see Arthur 1991; Smith 
1992). Also, this would be a difficult principle to apply in urban centres where 
Indigenous people are a small percentage of the whole population (see Fig. 1). For 
example, those Torres Strait Islanders living on mainland Australia have found it 
impossible to legitimise to State governments their claims for special attention, 
because they form small, dispersed and largely invisible urban populations 
(Arthur 1998). 
Fig. 2 ATSIC program resources, dollars per capita by ATSIC Region, 
1999–2000 
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Sources: ATSIC Annual Report (2000: 199 - 203);
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Corporate autonomy, or autonomy for a people, is based on the premise that 
these people have particular cultural traits that should be accommodated in 
certain decision-making processes. In this way ‘culture’ is the device that 
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legitimises people’s claim to some control over particular aspects of their lives 
(Ghai 2000: 8). Being based as it is on cultural difference or distinctiveness, it 
seems evident that this kind of autonomy can only apply to the group expressing 
a cultural difference, in this case Indigenous people, and to matters specifically 
pertaining to them. 
Corporate autonomy may also apply between Indigenous peoples. This has been 
the case in Australia between Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders (see 
Sanders & Arthur 2001). Torres Strait Islanders have argued for their own 
legislation and to be separate from ATSIC.10 The arguments for this autonomy, 
which have been legitimised largely by cultural difference, have been successful 
in Torres Strait but not outside it (Arthur 1998; Sanders and Arthur 2001). This 
matter is discussed further below. 
Regional autonomy (for a place) 
A more commonly discussed notion of autonomy is regional autonomy, that is, 
autonomy for a place rather than for a people. There are at least two possible 
forms of regional autonomy, one applying to only the Indigenous residents of a 
region and the another to all of the residents. Which of these might apply will 
hinge on a number of factors, such as demography (Fleras 1999: 198). Any form 
of regional autonomy will depend on the delineation and legitimisation of a region 
and some regions are easier to delineate than others.11 Regions can be formed 
geographically, as in the case of islands, straits, river valleys, and capes, or 
around particular industries: the goldfields of Western Australia and the Hunter 
and Barossa Valleys are all examples of this.12 Geopolitical factors, such as an 
international border, can also help describe a region (see Arthur 2001a). 
As regional autonomy is largely about the control of regional matters, another of 
its defining factors will be the ability of those in a region to form a political body 
to effectively administer this control (Hannum & Lillich 1981). This requires the 
regional population to recognise a ‘community of interest’ from which they are 
willing to elect or choose representatives to operate on their behalf in the regional 
body. It has been suggested that Indigenous people in Australia have a tendency 
to localism, individualism and factionalism, rather than to regionalism and that 
this reduces the likelihood of them forming regional bodies (see Edmunds 1999). 
Nonetheless, such bodies do exist—for example as land councils, resources 
agencies and as ATSIC Regional Councils. 
It has been suggested that it is easier to legitimise regionalism and regional 
control when there is already a federal system in place, such as is the case in 
Australia and in Canada, if for no other reason than that federalism is itself a 
system in which some powers have already been devolved from the centre (Beran 
1994: 9; Ghai 2000: 7; Hannum & Lillich 1981: 251). Norfolk and Christmas 
Islands are sometimes given as examples of this form of regional autonomy within 
the Australian federal system (Saunders 2000: 268; Fletcher 1992: 19–21). 
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The foregoing discussion suggests that regional autonomy requires the 
legitimisation of both a region and regional body. 
Regional autonomy applying to Indigenous people 
A form of regional autonomy might be one which applies only to the Indigenous 
people and affairs within a region. This could be termed Indigenous-specific 
regional autonomy. Again, it can be argued that ATSIC already represents this 
form of autonomy: the country is divided into 36 ATSIC regions, each with an 
elected Regional Council (RC) which has responsibility for certain Indigenous-
specific matters, finances and resources within its region.13 That is to say, the 
RCs have a degree of autonomy over their regional expenditures and matters. 
Because Indigenous-specific regional autonomy applies only to Indigenous people, 
it is independent of demography. ATSIC RCs exist in all areas, even those where 
Indigenous people are a fraction of the total population. 
However, the degree of this form of autonomy is probably highly variable due to 
demography and circumstances. For instance, a large proportion of Indigenous 
people live in regions on the eastern seaboard (see Fig. 1) which, compared to the 
less populated areas, have a high standard of services, and so have 
correspondingly small ATSIC budgets.14 For example, per capita program 
expenditures vary from between a low of $734 in the Sydney region to a high of 
$13,529 in Warburton, Western Australia (see Fig. 2). Generally we can see that 
where Indigenous populations are high—in cities and along the eastern 
seaboard—expenditures are low. Conversely where populations are low—in the 
centre and the north—expenditures are high. Therefore, if we equate the level of 
autonomy in a region with the level of Indigenous-specific resources under the 
control of RCs, then we can see that this form of autonomy is likely to be more 
significant for RCs in the north and centre, where expenditures are highest, than 
it is for RCs in the east and south. 
In addition, although each RC has its own budget, control over a large proportion 
of regional funds is held by ATSIC’s national office so that RCs only have 
discretionary powers over around 14 per cent of their funding (Djerrkura, Bedford 
& Williams 2000). Increasing Indigenous-specific regional autonomy in this case 
might include increasing this proportion. Such a change is largely an internal 
matter for the ATSIC system and would need to be negotiated between RCs and 
the ATSIC national office and Board of Commissioners. Such negotiations are 
already taking place (see Djerrkura, Bedford & Williams 2000) and are discussed 
below. 
ATSIC is Indigenous-specific at both a national and regional level. Other forms of 
Indigenous-specific representation also exist, for example in Indigenous land 
councils. An issue in such forms of elected representation is whether they are 
open to all Indigenous people in a region, or to a special class of Indigenous 
person, such as a traditional owner, or ‘elder’, however such classes might be 
defined. A form of bicameralism within the Indigenous domain might provide a 
way of accommodating more than one class of voter (see Sutton 1985). 
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Regional autonomy applying to all of the people in a region 
The other major form of regional autonomy would be one which applied to 
matters affecting all of the residents of that region, not just Indigenous residents. 
This would probably include the regional control of a large number of matters, 
and would tend to equate most closely with the notion of regional self-
government. As noted at the beginning of this paper, the lack of specificity as to 
what might be included in regional autonomy is itself a feature of the concept. 
However, several authors have suggested what the constituent parts of this form 
of autonomy might be (see Fleras 1999; Hannum & Lillich 1981; Poynton 1996). 
These are shown below, grouped by their political, cultural and economic 
characteristics. 
Political: 
• a representative body elected by all residents; 
• a level of authority to make some laws (legislative power); 
• possibly a local judiciary and police; 
• the possible control or provision of social services such as health, 
education and welfare; 
• possibly a degree of ‘international personality’, but usually excluding 
matters of defence, foreign relations and border control. 
Cultural: 
• the ability to adopt or include some cultural practices. 
Economic: 
• local decision making about federal expenditures; 
• some control over a share of the region’s natural resources (the most 
autonomous regions often being associated with the greatest control of 
resources); 
• the ability to collect taxes and to generate income. 
Political considerations 
If we assume that the rationale behind such autonomy is to give Indigenous 
people greater control over the region and if, as argued earlier, this has to be 
negotiated, then it would seem necessary for Indigenous people to legitimise why 
they should have this control. To do this Indigenous people would need to 
establish an identifiable territorial base and, usually, to be the majority of the 
population (Fleras 1999: 188, 200, 220). It is notable for example that the Inuit, 
who control the self-government of Nunavut in Canada’s north, account for 75 
per cent of the regional population (Brownlie 1992: 49; Ghai 2000: 8–10, 40; 
Watts 2000: 40). 
Under the system of local government elections, Indigenous people could 
notionally gain control of a region if they were the majority of the population. 
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However, taking the ATSIC regions as an example, we see that Indigenous people 
form the majority in only a few of these though they are a significant proportion in 
several others—mostly in the north and centre (Fig. 1). Of course, it is possible to 
change the demographic ratio by changing the regional boundaries and this is 
discussed below with respect to the Tiwi in the Northern Territory. 
Other devices for legitimising regions as indigenous territories may be of a more 
symbolic nature. Indigenous people can legitimise strong links with regions if 
these form culturally distinct blocks (Hannum & Lillich 1981: 216–18, 249). This 
device helped the Inuit legitimise the indigenous self-government of Nunavut in 
Canada (see Watts 2000: 37). Torres Strait Islanders are also well placed in this 
regard as they claim a common culture for all of Torres Strait—Ailan Kastom—so 
forming what amounts to a cultural region. In addition, having the same name as 
the officially gazetted Torres Strait provides Islanders with a type of symbolic link 
with the region that is not available to many other Indigenous groups. Possibly 
the Tiwi Islanders and the Pitjantjatjara are the only other groups which common 
usage associates with a distinct cultural region and territory (see below). 
Indigenous people might also be able to legitimise to the state and other residents 
the right to hold control over regions when they own, or have made claims to, 
large parts of its land or seas, or if they are significant players in local industries, 
such as pastoralism, fishing or tourism. The foregoing could apply to many parts 
of the Northern Territory, and Western Australia as well as to Torres Strait. As 
noted above, geopolitical factors, such as an international border, can help also 
describe a region. People can then claim a special identity as residents of a 
borderland; this has been the case in Torres Strait (see Arthur 2001a). 
It would seem self-evident that groups will be better able to legitimise the notion 
of a territory, and their right to control it, if they can articulate more than one 
form of linkage with a region. Where regional control does pass to indigenous 
people, an issue will be how to deal with the interests of the non-indigenous 
minority (Ghai 2000: 22). Again, this issue might be dealt with through a system 
of cultural bicameralism. 
Cultural considerations 
Forms of cultural autonomy might include an official system of bilingualism, as in 
the case of Quebec in Canada, or the Aland Islands of Finland (Hannum & Lillich 
1981: 247). It could also include indigenous radio or television stations or 
programs, as in the case of the Torres Strait Islander Media Association in Torres 
Strait, or the Central Aboriginal Media Association and Imparja television in the 
Northern Territory. 
Cultural autonomy might also include the use of indigenous legal systems. In the 
1980s the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) was commissioned to 
inquire into the possibility of recognising and including Indigenous customary law 
in the country (ALRC 1986). The Commission was unable to propose any overall 
or national system for this but suggested that a case by case approach might be 
appropriate (Rowse, forthcoming). There is some indication that this principle has 
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been adopted, albeit in a relatively ad hoc and quasi-official way. For example, in 
some parts of the country, Indigenous Law-men may deal out traditional penalties 
to offenders, with the knowledge, if not always the sanction, of the local 
mainstream police. In addition, and under Queensland State legislation, 
Indigenous communities in Torres Strait may employ their own police, hold 
community courts and make community by-laws. The application of customary 
law might be manifested through the cultural bicameralism discussed earlier, 
where a council of elders could advise an elected body on how to take account of 
cultural matters in decision making. However, as is discussed elsewhere in this 
paper, it may also be the case that culture is used as a way of legitimising other 
aspects of autonomy. 
Economic considerations 
Some analysts have considered the possible relationships between the economic 
and political aspects of autonomy (see Altman, Arthur & Sanders 1996). One view 
of this relationship is that forms of political autonomy may lead to economic 
advancement (Australia Institute 2000: vii; Courchene 1993). However, there is 
little or no evidence for this correlation. For example in Canada, the granting of 
self-government over Nunavut to the Inuit does not seem to have led to any 
appreciable economic development (Fleras & Elliot 1992: 46, 47), nor has political 
autonomy per se led to the economic advancement of many post-colonial states. 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that a certain economic status could be a 
precondition for granting political autonomy (Fleras 1999: 20). For instance, in 
the early 1990s, the then Prime Minister indicated that greater political autonomy 
for Torres Strait would depend on some regional economic improvements, a 
position adopted by the 1997 Parliamentary Inquiry (HORSCATSIA 1997, and see 
below). Suggesting that political autonomy be dependent on economic status 
mirrors the stand taken by the colonial powers during the early period of post-war 
decolonisation and that indeed characterised Australia’s approach to Papua New 
Guinean independence in the 1970s (see Parker 1971). However, this general 
stance was later invalidated by UN Resolution 1514 of 1960 (Lemon 1993) and 
seems less sustainable today. For instance, it is not a condition or requirement 
placed on any of Australia’s External Territories. 
The goal of central governments in granting political autonomy can be a reduction 
in the level of regional dependency on government funding (Fleras & Elliot 1992: 
46, 47, 49). This may be a hard goal to achieve. For example, raising revenue 
through taxes and charges (such as housing rents) can be difficult as indigenous 
incomes are often low, and fees such as rates often do not apply on indigenous 
land. Even the control of regional resources (as discussed below) may not raise 
much income as this depends on the value of the resource base and this varies 
considerably. In fact it has been suggested that those regions seeking autonomy 
often have a very poor resource base, and that therefore indigenous people may 
want to maintain their (dependent) relationship with central government rather 
than becoming too autonomous (Beran 1994; Fleras 1999: 221, 224; Hannum & 
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Lillich 1981: 253). This implies a form of autonomy which includes continuing 
dependency. Does such a status have any credibility? 
The concepts of negative and positive autonomy maybe useful in addressing this 
question. Negative autonomy describes a situation where people have the power 
to stop others, such a government or its bureaucracies, interfering in their affairs 
and actions (Crocker 1980: 1; Galipeau 1994: 88–92). Positive autonomy 
meanwhile is defined more by what people can actually do for themselves 
(Crocker 1980: 2); it is about having the power to take actions and to be proactive 
(Galipeau 1994: 88, 104; Jackson 1990: 29). This distinction has been applied to 
an analysis of post-colonial states, confirming that while these have gained 
political independence they have become economically dependent on international 
aid (Arthur 2001b). This is because, although the international community can 
give them political autonomy, it cannot give them economic power (Jackson 1990: 
21). This in turn is because economic power depends on resources and access to 
markets and not on political or moral will (Jackson 1990: 30). Thus, although 
these states are relatively free from political interference from others, they have 
only a limited ability to be proactive in their development and they remain 
economically dependent on outside aid. That is to say, they have negative 
autonomy but not positive autonomy.15 While the goal of reducing economic 
dependency is worthwhile, the distinction between negative and positive 
autonomy provides a way of breaking any implied determinism between the 
economic and political aspects of autonomy. In addition, whereas Jackson 
identified negative autonomy in countries dependent on international aid, the 
concept may be applicable to situations within nation states where groups are 
dependent on the welfare system for incomes and services. In these situations, 
negative autonomy can be characterised as a form of welfare autonomy (Arthur 
2001b). 
The discussion so far suggests at least three principal types of autonomy for 
indigenous people: 
• corporate autonomy applying only to indigenous-specific issues; 
• regional autonomy applying only to indigenous-specific issues; and  
• regional autonomy applying to all people and issues in a region and under 
indigenous control. 
Intersecting all of these are the notions of negative and positive autonomy which 
may provide a useful way of considering the economic aspects of autonomy. 
The conditions under which these forms of autonomy might prevail are likely to 
be quite different. The next section of the paper discusses four regions where 
Indigenous autonomy has been considered. These are Torres Strait, the Tiwi 
Islands and Miwatj in the Northern Territory, and Murdi Paaki ATSIC Region in 
New South Wales (see Fig. 1). Most attention is given to exploring to whom 
autonomy might apply and what it might include, by examining the way regions 
and regional bodies are constituted and legitimised. 
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Torres Strait. 
Torres Strait as a region 
Several factors help delineate Torres Strait as a distinct region. First it is a narrow 
stretch of water lying between Australia’s Cape York and Papua New Guinea. Its 
islands have a regional integrity, being contained within the Strait on the one 
hand, and separated from the mainland on the other (as in the so called blue-
water theory). The Strait is also identified as a special zone (The Torres Strait 
Protected Zone) by the international Treaty between Papua New Guinea and 
Australia established in the 1970s, and it has always been treated as a discrete 
administrative region by the Queensland colonial Government and then later, by 
the Commonwealth Government (Arthur 1999: 60). 
Several factors also combine to legitimise the Strait as an Indigenous region. 
Islanders and Aboriginal people account for between 75 and 80 per cent of the 
regional population of some 7,500 people; the region and the majority Indigenous 
group (Torres Strait Islanders) share the same name—a significant symbolic 
legitimiser (MacLeod 1998); the Strait is Australia’s only Melanesian cultural 
region, with its own distinctive languages, music, dance, and form of Christianity, 
all encapsulated in the term Ailan Kastom (ATSIC 1993: 36; Arthur 2001a). 
On the other hand, regional integrity is not complete. For example, two Islander 
communities (Seisia and Bamaga), though included administratively in Torres 
Strait, are actually located on the tip of Cape York, next to Aboriginal 
communities and on Aboriginal land. These two communities were established by 
the government in the middle of the twentieth century to house Islanders who 
had been displaced by severe flooding on some northern islands (Arthur 1990). In 
addition, the Inner Islands of the Strait, those around and including Thursday 
Island, are the home of the Kaurareg people, a group which often identifies 
separately from Torres Strait Islanders (Sanders & Arthur 2001). Lastly, since 
World War II, Islanders have moved from the Strait to the mainland, so that now 
some 80 per cent of the national Torres Strait Islander population is found 
outside the region. These regional anomalies will be considered below. 
Regional bodies 
At the level of Indigenous political representation, regional bodies have been in 
place for some time. The Island Coordinating Council (ICC) was set up under 
Queensland State legislation in 1980s and is composed of the elected chairs of 17 
island community councils. The ICC deals with and advises the State Government 
on State-related Islander affairs and services. There is also the Torres Strait 
Regional Authority (TSRA) established under Commonwealth legislation and 
dealing with Commonwealth-related funding and services for Islanders. The TSRA 
replaced the former ATSIC Torres Strait Regional Council (TSRC) in 1994 on the 
recommendation of the first review of the ATSIC Act (see ATSIC 1993) and was 
given powers similar to that of the Commission itself. More recently the TSRA’s 
fiscal arrangements were changed so that it could receive a one-line budget 
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directly from the Department of Finance which was entirely separate from the 
ATSIC system (Office of Evaluation and Audit 2001), and legislation for the TSRA 
separate from the ATSIC Act is presently being prepared. The rationale for these 
changes, and for the formation of the TSRA, was to make Islanders more 
autonomous of ATSIC than are ATSIC’s RCs (ATSIC 1993: 7, 37; Sanders 1994), 
and was legitimised very much on the basis that Islanders are culturally distinct 
from Aboriginal people (ATSIC 1993: 37; Herron 1996; Liberal Party 1996: 3). 
In the setting up of the TSRC and then the TSRA it was decided that they should 
be made up of the same people as those in the already established ICC (see 
Sanders 1994) and this has meant that the TSRA and the ICC have operated very 
much in concert. Because they were established by State and Commonwealth 
Governments respectively, it can be argued that this has facilitated Islander 
involvement with the two governments in an integrated fashion. Substantial 
Commonwealth–State infrastructure agreements have been made in Torres Strait, 
no doubt assisted by this ICC–TSRA relationship. 
The Treaty between Papua New Guinea and Australia established Torres Strait as 
Protected Zone. This is managed by an Protected Zone Joint Authority (PZJA) 
composed at its highest level of the relevant State and Commonwealth Ministers. 
The Treaty also officially recognised the Indigenous inhabitants, and this had 
some consequences for Islander autonomy. First, Islanders have been included in 
several of the PZJA’s management committees, giving them a position alongside 
State and Commonwealth agencies and non-Indigenous fishermen. After stating 
some dissatisfaction with this level of involvement, the Chair of the TSRA was 
given observer status at meetings between the State and Commonwealth 
Ministers, with a recent commitment to make the Chair a full participant. Second, 
the Treaty included an agreement for Australia and Papua New Guinea to share 
and jointly manage the Strait’s marine resources. This has required formal and 
regular meetings between Papua New Guinean representatives and Islander 
representatives, giving Islanders something of an international profile or 
personality. Third, the Authority’s policy has been to increase Indigenous 
involvement in commercial fishing. To this end Islanders were granted 
concessions on fishing licences, and the rights to any expansion in the rock 
lobster fishery. Apparently as a result, Islanders have become significant players 
in commercial fishing (Altman, Arthur & Bek 1994). 
Thus Islanders have already achieved some form of regional autonomy. However, 
this is largely Islander-specific. Is there any indication of moves to fuller regional 
autonomy?  
Autonomy for all? 
In the past, the Kaurareg of the Inner Islands, have largely been excluded from 
regional matters; they were never formed into an island council.16 And as a result, 
they were not included in the ICC–TSRA or on the committees of the PZJA (Arthur 
1990).17 Recently there have been efforts to re-incorporate the Kaurareg into 
regional affairs and there is now a commitment to make them members of the 
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TSRA. Indeed, the health portfolio within the TSRA is now held by a Kaurareg 
representative. It is likely that this incorporation of the Kaurareg has been 
stimulated both by the issue of regional autonomy and by native title. Although 
the Kaurareg do not form an island council, they are recognised as the traditional 
owners of the Inner Islands under native title and this has no doubt legitimised 
their inclusion in regional affairs.18  
The Torres Strait region, as noted above, includes two Islander communities 
located on Cape York. Although Islanders from these communities have 
intermarried with their Aboriginal neighbours, there is some degree of separation, 
and even some animosity between them (Arthur 1990). Indications are that the 
Aboriginal people would not wish to be included in any form of regional autonomy 
with Torres Strait Islanders. When asked by the HORSCATSIA Inquiry if there 
was any possibility that the two groups could share a future, the deputy chair of 
one of the Aboriginal communities replied: 
Not if I can help it. The Torres Strait Islands had different needs and looked on the 
people of the Cape as mainlanders. If they had autonomy, they would see to their 
needs first. A community such as Injinoo would be outvoted (Hansard 1996: 6). 
On the issue of whether autonomy would apply to non-Indigenous residents of 
Torres Strait, Islander leaders have over the years voiced the desire to change 
their political and economic situation (see Altman, Arthur & Sanders 1996). Their 
most extreme action was to claim, at one point, independence from Australia, 
though there are indications that this represented an ambit claim, lodged to make 
other more practical gains in services and infrastructure. Islanders have also 
stated that they want a form of regional self-government, possibly like that of an 
Australian External Territory. Following lobbying from Islanders, in 1996 the 
Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs 
instructed the House of Representatives to hold an Inquiry into the possibility and 
advisability of increasing Islander autonomy. This resulted in the New Deal 
(HORSCATSIA 1997). 
The main recommendations of the New Deal were that the ICC, TSRA and the 
Torres Shire be scrapped and replaced with a Torres Strait Regional Assembly. 
The Assembly would have representatives drawn from all residents and have 
powers similar to the present TSRA. Attached to the Assembly would be a cultural 
council made up of Indigenous residents which would deal with cultural matters. 
Although the fit between the fully representative body and the cultural council 
was unclear, the system represented a form of cultural bicameralism. Will 
Sanders has analysed the Inquiry as ‘a missed opportunity’ to increase autonomy 
largely because it misread the true political situation in the Strait (Sanders 2000). 
Certainly the Inquiry took a direction never intended by the Commonwealth. 
When the Minister proposed the Inquiry he said that: 
[there] can be no question that Torres Strait Islanders enjoy a distinctly different 
culture to Aboriginal people. As a result, we have referred the question of greater 
autonomy from ATSIC to a joint parties committee (Herron 1996; emphasis added). 
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Therefore the initial aim was to inquire into possibilities for more autonomy, but 
only for Islanders and only from ATSIC. The rationale for this was, once again, 
cultural difference from Australia’s other Indigenous group, Aboriginal people. 
There was no intention to create a form of regional autonomy for all citizens. 
Considerations of ‘who’ autonomy might apply to had not been articulated before 
the Inquiry took place. During the Inquiry, one Islander leader was adamant that 
it was to apply only to Indigenous people. Others were less clear. Some non-
Indigenous residents asked me if I thought ‘they’ (meaning Torres Strait 
Islanders) would get autonomy, placing non-Indigenous residents outside the 
process, a fact that concerned the Shire mayor. Subsequently several meetings 
were held which included non-Indigenous people. Observing one of these I felt 
that there was no great antagonism towards the notion of autonomy for all people 
in the region, though there was some scepticism that any practical benefits would 
result. Within the Shire Council itself there was some hope that greater regional 
autonomy might bring economic benefits, possibly in the shape of tax 
concessions. 
Following the publication of the New Deal Islanders indicated that any new 
regional representative body should be ‘culturally appropriate’ and some 
consideration was given to a ‘Council of Elders’ (Indigenous elders) to sit 
alongside a more fully representative body. This would have mirrored the cultural 
bicameral model proposed in the New Deal, forms of which, as noted earlier, 
already operate in some parts of the South Pacific. On the other hand, some 
Islanders were concerned about the role and powers of such a council and 
indications are that this model is now less favoured. Some islands, in part 
because of the demands of the native title legislation, are now moving to clan-
based island councils (Sanders & Arthur 2001). For example, on Saibai each of 
the seven clans can elect one councillor each, with this Council then electing its 
Chair. In sanctioning this move the State Government stated: 
The system was designed by the people of Saibai, who presented the Government 
with a strong case for a new government structure that would recognise their age-
old culture ... the Labor Government upholds the right of indigenous communities to 
have governing structures that suit their diverse cultures, and has introduced a 
regulation that enables this unique Saibai system (Queensland State Minister for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy, Press release, 24 March 2000). 
This culturally modified representation makes island local government 
Indigenous-specific and it is possible that this will be the level at which 
government and representation is made ‘culturally appropriate’.19 It may also 
reflect a longstanding desire by individual islands to retain autonomy at the 
island level in the face of regionalism (see Arthur 1990).20 
Following the Inquiry, some Islanders have continued to express the long-term 
goal of Territory status within the Australian nation-state. This would require 
excising the Strait from Queensland, a difficult process (see Sanders & Arthur 
2001) and would draw the region closer to the Commonwealth. This would fulfil 
the desire of some Islanders to deal directly with Canberra on certain issues 
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rather than with the Queensland Government (see also Davis 1998). As a former 
TSRA Chair said: ‘This would cut out having to deal with the “middle-man” in 
Brisbane’.21 However, many of the Commonwealth submissions to the Inquiry 
stated the need to retain strong centralised (i.e. Commonwealth) control of the 
Strait because it includes the international border with Papua New Guinea and is 
contiguous with a part of the wider region that is increasingly politically unstable. 
We see here how the geopolitical feature of the border can be used by the state in 
an attempt to legitimise its integrity. This feature may limit the degree of 
separation that either the State or Commonwealth Governments might consider 
for the region. 
To respond to the New Deal, a task force was formed composed of the Chair of the 
TSRA, the Mayor of Torres Shire and the Chair of the ICC. The Task Force held 
discussions with communities across the Strait and in October 2001 the TSRA 
produced a paper entitled ‘Torres Strait Regional Government’ (Waia 2001). This 
paper expresses the long-term goal, not of Territory status, but of a territory style 
of government. This may alleviate the problems associated with making a full 
territory, discussed above. It is envisaged that this regional government would 
encompass all residents of the Strait (Waia 2001). 
Under the arrangement, the Strait would be made up of 21 communities or units 
which would also be formed into six sub-regions.22 All the residents of the 21 
units would elect a representative each, to form the ‘territory government’ and 
also elect a chairperson from amongst these. A group with portfolio 
responsibilities would be formed from the six sub-regions.23 The existing 
community local government and the Torres Shire would remain. The 21 
government representatives would decide on regional policies and priorities, and 
give direction to the portfolio group (Waia 2001). 
The intention is that the government would act for all residents and the paper 
states that the rights and interests of all residents would need to be recognised. 
However, an additional aim is the promotion and development of Ailan Kastom 
which by its definition is Islander-specific. How these two possibly contradictory 
aims would be reconciled is not clear at this stage. 
In any event, the paper stresses that this territory-style government is a long-term 
aim, possibly coming to fruition in 2003. The intention is to utilise the intervening 
period to both consolidate existing systems and transform these into the regional 
government. In former years, the members of the ICC and TSRA have been drawn 
largely from the Strait’s Outer Islands, rather than from the Inner Islands which 
are the domain of the Torres Shire and the place where most non-Indigenous 
people live. Previously, therefore, there had been a political and functional 
distance between the ICC–TSRA and the Shire, with the ICC–TSRA representing 
Indigenous concerns and the Shire non-Indigenous concerns. In recent years, and 
since the election of an Islander mayor, the Shire has increased its association 
with, and presence on, the TSRA. There is now a commitment to making the Shire 
a full member of TSRA and to strengthening the links between it, the ICC and the 
TSRA. The New Deal suggested that the ICC and TSRA duplicated each other and 
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the Commonwealth government proposed that consideration should be given to 
amalgamating them. This amalgamation, at an administrative level, forms part of 
the TSRA’s proposal for the transition to regional government (Waia 2001) and 
will make the Torres Strait the only region in the country where the State and 
Commonwealth Indigenous functions are under a joint administration.  
Islanders already have influence in some service areas. For instance, a Health 
Council was established in 1990 to provide community input to health services, 
and this led to the formation of a Torres Strait Health Strategy and Policy in 1993. 
In the same year, an Islander was made Chief Executive Officer of the regional 
hospital. In other areas, the TSRA, in consultation with government agencies, has 
developed a Marine Strategy for Torres Strait, and has also published a code of 
conduct for carrying out research across the region. The TSRA has also been 
successful in negotiating with the State and Commonwealth Governments over 
large infrastructure programs, though mostly for Islander communities (TSRA 
1999). However, the proposed territory-style government would carry out more 
functions than the present TSRA (Waia 2001). What these functions might be are 
not clear at the present time. As indicated above, it is accepted that these will be 
negotiated with the State and Commonwealth Governments during the period of 
transition to regional government. The aim is to establish a policy group to carry 
out these negotiations (Waia 2001). 
These moves have the potential to bring those leaders who have interests in State, 
Commonwealth and local government matters closer together; and to bridge the 
divide between the Inner and the Outer Islands, and the Islander and non-
Islander domains. They also have the potential to realise a form of autonomy for 
all residents. 
Increased control of the region’s resources is an oft-repeated goal of Islanders. 
This means, primarily, increased control of fisheries (Sanders & Arthur 2001). 
The implication is that the input Islanders have to the PZJA as described earlier, 
does not meet their notion of autonomy. Recently, their dissatisfaction was 
manifested in a threat to ban non-Indigenous commercial fishers from the region 
(Koori Mail, April 18, 2001). The New Deal did not include increased Indigenous 
control of the region’s resources in its recommendations. Rather it suggested that 
Islanders should engage more in the economy, especially the private sector, with 
the aim of reducing the seemingly unacceptably high welfare bill to the region. It 
is likely Islanders will continue to push for more control in fisheries. In July this 
year, when discussing autonomy, the Chair of the TSRA stated that: 
Islanders needed to be included in decisions on issues such as fisheries … where 
input is limited … we have very little control over that … Licences are issued by the 
Queensland Government and we’d like our people in the top positions and maybe 
one day the authority will be given to the people (Cairns Post, July 9, 2001). 
On the other hand, there may also be attempts to adopt some of the suggestions 
in the New Deal. For instance, the proposal for a regional government states the 
intention to revise the Torres Strait Development Plan and to establish a Torres 
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Strait Development Task Force, all with the aim of strengthening the region’s 
economic base, largely through the fishing industry (Waia 2001). 
Mainlanders 
As noted above, 80 per cent of all people identifying as Islanders live outside 
Torres Strait (Sanders & Arthur 2001). These are the so-called mainlanders as 
distinct from the homelanders resident in the Strait. Mainlanders are represented 
through the Torres Strait Islander Advisory Board (TSIAB) and the Office of Torres 
Strait Islander Affairs (OTSIA) which are both part of ATSIC. They also have their 
own non-government organisations in several major towns and cities (Arthur 
1998). Being part of ATSIC, mainlanders bid for resources alongside Aboriginal 
people through ATSIC RCs. As Aboriginal people are in the majority and have the 
cultural legitimacy of being on their own land, mainlanders feel disadvantaged. 
Though they live on the mainland, studies have shown that mainlanders retain 
many attachments to the Strait (ABS/CAEPR 1997). 
These factors led mainlanders to express their aspirations for autonomy to the 
Inquiry in two ways. One was for autonomy as a people from ATSIC through the 
formation of a separate Islander Commission. This is a form of corporate 
autonomy, but one applying between Indigenous peoples. The other form of 
autonomy aspired to by mainlanders was for them to be included in decision-
making about Torres Strait. This would be similar to the non-residential regional 
representation enjoyed by Cook Islanders who live in New Zealand. Mainlanders 
were unsuccessful on both these counts. The New Deal proposed that they 
remain inside ATSIC and that, if greater control passed to a regional body in 
Torres Strait, they should only have observer status on it. 
I suggest that the mainlanders’ lack of success can be attributed to their inability 
to legitimise their position. Though distinct culturally, they are a small dispersed 
population living in the Aboriginal cultural domain. Though mainlanders made 
strong representation about autonomy at the annual national workshop following 
the Inquiry, the workshop themes in 2000 and 2001 have been ‘economic 
development’ and ‘health’ respectively, suggesting that political autonomy has 
declined in importance for the moment.24 The recent paper on ‘Torres Strait 
Regional Government’ (Waia 2001) does not include provisions for mainlanders. 
However, during the presentation of the regional government paper at the 11th 
national seminar/workshop, the Chair of the TSRA indicated that the plans for 
Torres Strait included forming an Memorandum of Understanding with 
mainlanders. This would be likely to include provisions to protect the native title 
rights of mainlanders and to shorten the eligibility period for voting if they should 
return to the Strait. 
In summary, Indigenous people in Torres Strait seem focused on regional 
autonomy for Torres Strait, that is for ‘place’, and so are attempting to address 
the position of non-Indigenous residents. Mainlanders meanwhile have been more 
interested in autonomy for a ‘people’, as in Islander autonomy from Aboriginal 
people. 
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Following the Inquiry in Torres Strait, ATSIC prepared a discussion paper to 
explore the idea of autonomy with Aboriginal communities across the country and 
subsequently produced its own report (ATSIC 1999; Djerrkura, Bedford & 
Williams 2000). During this period several regions began preparing documents 
relating to autonomy. Those regions for which information is available at this 
stage are the Tiwi Islands and Miwatj in the Northern Territory, and Murdi Paaki 
in New South Wales. These are discussed briefly below. 
The Tiwi (Bathurst and Melville) Islands 
The Tiwi islands as a region 
In 2000, the Tiwi Islands Regional Coordinating Committee (TIRCC) submitted a 
proposal to the Northern Territory Government for a system of regional autonomy 
for the Tiwi people which would operate over the Melville and Bathurst Islands 
(see TIRCC 2000).25 The islands are one ward of the present ATSIC Jabiru Region. 
When ATSIC was first formed in 1990, it was made up of 60 Regions, one of 
which was the ‘Tiwi Islands’ (Melville and Bathurst Islands). Following 
amendments to the Act in 1993, several regions were rationalised to reduce the 
number to 36. Some Indigenous people complained that this did not match 
cultural patterns as closely as the original scheme and so  a desire to revert to the 
Islands as the unit of autonomy suggests that people are using culture to 
legitimise the integrity of the region. This is also recognised more broadly, 
because although ‘the Tiwi Islands’ are not gazetted, the name has become 
synonymous with Melville and Bathurst Islands. The proposal for the new region 
also legitimises claims for autonomy on the basis of Indigeneity, for whereas it is 
estimated that Indigenous people are an 67 per cent of the Jabiru regional 
population, they are around 90 per cent of the of the Tiwi Islands’ population of 
2,300 (TIRCC 2000: 10) (see Fig. 1). All of these features are reflected in the 
proposal which notes that part of the rationale for adopting the islands as the 
region of autonomy is that they represent a ‘community of interest based on 
tribal, language, geographical, economic and social factors’ (TIRCC 2000: 7). 
Though a new region for the purpose of Tiwi Local government, the area would 
still be within the ATSIC Jabiru Region, and the Indigenous residents would 
remain part of ATSIC and be eligible to vote in ATSIC elections and stand for the 
ATSIC RC. 
A regional body 
The autonomy model also proposed a new governing system in which four 
Community Management Boards (CMBs), elected on the basis of ‘skin groupings’ 
and residency, would replace existing community councils.26 A regional Tiwi 
Assembly would be formed made up of made up of two parts, one of trustees 
elected from the Tiwi clans, and the other of representatives chosen by the CMBs 
from the ‘skin groupings’ in the community (TIRCC 2000).27  
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In 2001, this proposal was modified and a constitution drafted for a Tiwi Islands 
Local Government to be established under the Northern Territory Local 
Government Act (Northern Territory of Australia (NTA) 2001). As in the original 
proposal, the regional unit would be the islands, and CMBs would be established 
for each of the four communities. Those eligible to vote in CMB elections and to 
be members of CMBs, would have to comply with residential requirements and 
also be members of ‘skin groups’, though these requirements would vary from 
community to community. Instead of having an Assembly, the Tiwi Islands Local 
Government would comprise eight persons appointed under the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976, and nine selected by the CMBs. The structure 
therefore is a mixture of mainstream and Indigenous- or culturally-specific forms 
of representation. This is confirmed in the preamble to the constitution which 
indicates that an aim is to ‘join the responsibilities and structures of traditional 
authority with modern local government’. It is hard to see, therefore, how it 
represents a form of autonomy that could ever apply to all residents. Indeed, 
because eligibility to vote and membership is (in some cases) restricted to those 
from Tiwi ‘skin groups’, the system is specific to not just Indigenous people, but 
to Tiwi Islanders. The problem of how to accommodate non-Tiwi interests in the 
system was recognised in the original proposal (TIRCC 2000: 16) but has yet to be 
addressed. 
The preamble of the constitution says that the Tiwi will ‘establish a framework of 
regional governance to manage the internal affairs of the Tiwi Islands’ and that it 
will act as a ‘framework for partnerships arrangements with the Northern 
Territory Government in the key areas of service delivery and economic 
development’ (NTA 2001: 1). The specific powers and functions as laid out in Part 
3 of the constitution are largely those of local government, including the power to 
make by-laws. Powers which seem additional to those normally held by local 
government include those to provide educational and other vocational training; 
establish and operate pastoral and commercial enterprises; promote and develop 
tourist attractions and facilities within the area; and produce and sell artefacts 
and souvenirs (NTA 2001: 7). 
However, the economic rationale of the scheme is unclear. Natural resources and 
activities such as barramundi fishing, prawn farming, forestry and cypress oil 
extraction are noted in the original proposal, but there is no suggestion that 
control of these would pass to Tiwi Islanders. Though an aim of the original 
proposal was to reduce regional dependency on welfare, there is no indication of 
how this might occur. On the contrary, the proposal acknowledged that, because 
incomes are low and rates cannot be charged on Aboriginal land, the ability to 
raise revenue is limited, and external support from government will have to 
continue (TIRCC 2000: 39–40). Though there is some suggestion that 
communities would share resources, it is unclear whether this might reduce 
operating costs (TIRCC 2000: 14, 26, 41). 
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Miwatj 
Proposals for a region 
In 1999, the Northern Territory Department of Local Government assisted the 
ATSIC Miwatj RC to prepare a discussion paper entitled: A Possible Model for a 
Miwatj Regional Government which outlined, for discussion only, a form of 
regional autonomy (see Northern Territory Government (NTG) 1999: 3).28 The 
regional government would cover the present ATSIC region of Miwatj, but exclude 
the town of Nhulunbuy (NTG 1999: 4).29 The ABS Census shows that in 1996 the 
Miwatj regional population was 7,000 of which 59 per cent were Indigenous 
people. Excluding the town of Nhulunbuy, where most non-Indigenous people 
reside, would have the effect of raising the Indigenous proportion of the proposed 
region’s population to around 85 per cent, making it considerably more 
Indigenous. 
A regional body 
The Miwatj Regional Government, as proposed in the discussion paper, would 
apply to the region’s ten existing communities and their community councils. The 
present Miwatj ATSIC RC would be converted into a Regional Authority composed 
of two ‘chambers’. The first chamber, called the Elder’s Council, would be made 
up of local traditional owners or those culturally qualified to make decisions 
about land, cultural matters and traditional leadership, and would be nominated 
by community residents. The second chamber would elected by all of the region’s 
residents and would carry out statutory functions required by the Local 
Government Act, and make charges on residents and raise revenue for the 
functions of the Regional Government (NTG 1999: 8). The Elder’s Council would 
mostly concern itself with decisions about land and culture and could veto 
decisions made by the second chamber. Thus, the proposed system would be a 
form of the ‘cultural bicameralism’ discussed earlier.  
The role of the Regional Government would be to coordinate regional services 
which might be provided under service agreements with the relevant government 
bodies. It was estimated that such a regional system would result in better 
coordination of services and an increase in resource sharing, which could save 
some $0.5 million a year (NTG 1999: 16, 19). This suggests that part of Northern 
Territory’s aim in supporting this form of regional government is improved 
efficiency and cost savings. In fact, the discussion paper suggests that this would 
be a condition of regional government (NTG 1999: 14). Although there is some 
mention of economic development in the discussion paper, no examples are given 
and there is no indication that control of regional resources would pass to the 
Regional Government. 
The Miwatj model as proposed by the discussion paper attempts to embrace all 
residents through the agency of cultural bicameralism but at the same time 
excludes most non-Indigenous people by excising the town of Nhulunbuy. It 
therefore seems largely an Indigenous-specific regional model, and one that is 
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mostly about the improved delivery of services to Indigenous people. Here the 
economic aspect of autonomy is not about the transfer of the control of resources 
to Indigenous people but about reducing costs through increased efficiency, and 
revenue raising. Given that the discussion paper was produced by the NTG, these 
aspects may well reflect its Local Government Reform and Development Agenda, 
part of which is to reduce government expenditures. 
Murdi Paaki 
The Murdi Paaki or Bourke ATSIC RC of western New South Wales (see Fig. 1) has 
recently produced a paper aimed at stimulating discussion about regional 
governance (Murdi Paaki n.d.).30 This RC operates in a different socio-political 
environment from the ones described above. First, it is located in a non-
Indigenous region; there are around 7,000 Indigenous people in Murdi Paaki but, 
unlike in the Tiwi Islands, Miwatj or Torres Strait, they make up only 14 per cent 
of the total population of their region. Also, although there are some discrete 
Indigenous communities in this and similar parts of rural Australia, these are not 
so clearly delineated from the non-Indigenous world as are those in the northern 
and remote parts of the country. Here, Indigenous people may live in close 
proximity to each other in neighbourhoods of country towns. Though these may 
often be on the fringes, they are still an integral part of these towns and are 
serviced by the same local governments as non-Indigenous people. Legitimising 
an Indigenous region, and forming a discrete community of interest in this 
environment is more difficult. The Murdi Paaki proposal acknowledges this as a 
difficulty and as one which probably limits the options for Indigenous regional 
government. 
As a result, the RC does not aspire to form a regional government. Instead, it 
proposes that the ATSIC RC should remain, but be strengthened by increasing 
Indigenous involvement in its operations. The RC’s strategy for doing this is to 
establish Community Working Parties (CWPs) composed of people from the 
region’s Indigenous population (Murdi Paaki n.d.: 5, 9). These CWPs would then 
provide input to the RC, thus creating a form of ‘community of interest’ (Murdi 
Paaki n.d.: 4). 
The RC’s aim is to become more involved in decision-making about service 
delivery and economic development (Murdi Paaki n.d.: 9), possibly through 
partnerships with government agencies and through joint ventures with 
businesses in the private sector (Murdi Paaki n.d.: 28). In addition, the RC would 
like to achieve some greater fiscal autonomy from the ATSIC centre. As noted 
earlier, on average, councils have discretion over only around 14 per cent of their 
budgets, the remainder being controlled by ATSIC central office. The RC would 
like to have control over a larger proportion of these funds (Murdi Paaki n.d.: 15). 
This is a desire common amongst RCs and has led to a recommendation by ATSIC 
that their role be strengthened rather than their being replaced by Regional 
Authorities as has occurred in Torres Strait (Djerrkura, Bedford & Williams 2000: 
8). As was noted earlier, this form of autonomy within ATSIC is likely to be more 
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common amongst those RCs in less remote regions, such as Murdi Paaki, where 
Indigenous people are a smaller proportion of the population. 
Although the Murdi Paaki model is regional, it is not about regional government 
by Indigenous people, nor does it include establishing a new regional governing 
body. Rather it aims to build on existing arrangements to give more autonomy 
and authority to the RC, within ATSIC. It appears to be largely an Indigenous-
specific model. 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored the notion of autonomy and how it might apply to 
Indigenous people in Australia. It has examined some relevant literature and 
analysed case studies from several regions, namely Torres Strait, the Tiwi Islands 
and Miwatj in Northern Territory, and the Murdi Paaki region in New South 
Wales. 
Several propositions were put at the outset. Autonomy is largely about degrees of 
control. It takes two principal forms: corporate autonomy (autonomy for a people) 
and autonomy for a place (regional autonomy). Cross-cutting these principal 
forms is the issue of scope: of whether autonomy would apply only to Indigenous 
people or to all people. The scope of autonomy will influence what it is that 
autonomy (control) is to be over. Thus, autonomy is also about who controls 
what. Almost by definition, corporate autonomy is likely to apply only to 
Indigenous people, while regional autonomy may apply to Indigenous people or to 
all residents. Regional autonomy is likely to require the delineation of a region 
and the formation of a body that can hold regional control. Autonomy is relative 
not absolute, and represents the passing of control from one group or party to 
another. Rather than viewing this process as a right, it is useful to consider it as 
something that has to be negotiated. This implies that the parties to the 
negotiation need to legitimise their positions. It follows that the form and type of 
autonomy is likely to vary because people’s ability to legitimise their position may 
depend on their circumstances. 
An additional cross-cutting theme can be represented by a distinction between 
negative and positive autonomy, where negative autonomy represents the 
autonomy from interference from others in one’s affairs (autonomy from) while 
positive autonomy represents the ability to direct one’s own affairs (autonomy to). 
This binary distinction (and it is a distinction, not an opposition) is largely a 
function of economic power. 
Most attention has been given in the paper to exploring to whom regional 
autonomy might apply and what it might include, by examining the way regions 
and regional bodies are constituted and legitimised. 
Regarding corporate autonomy, it is suggested that corporate autonomy for 
Indigenous people is represented, in part, by ATSIC. Because ATSIC’s 
responsibilities are Indigenous-specific, any increase in this form of autonomy 
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would also be likely to apply to Indigenous matters only. Such an increase would 
require more resources to be transferred from government to ATSIC. The current 
trend is in the opposite direction, and this would suggest that ATSIC is 
experiencing some difficulty legitimising to government its position as the carrier 
of Indigenous corporate autonomy. 
Torres Strait Islanders have striven for some time for corporate autonomy from 
Aboriginal people in the shape of their own Commission, separate from ATSIC. 
This represents a form of corporate autonomy between Indigenous groups but one 
that still must be legitimised. Those in Torres Strait itself have succeeded in 
achieving this autonomy to a significant degree, because, it can be argued, there 
is a range of cultural and geographic circumstances that allow them to legitimise 
and negotiate their position. Mainland Torres Strait Islanders have, however, not 
been successful in the same aim. Demographic factors are significant here: 
though they are culturally distinct (from Aboriginal people) mainlanders are a 
relatively small population dispersed through a much larger one, and it is difficult 
for them to legitimise a case for corporate autonomy. However, it is the 
Indigenous proportion of the population, not its absolute size, that is the key 
demographic factor in such cases. For example, the 6,000 Islanders in Torres 
Strait are 80 per cent of the population and can legitimise their case, but 
mainlanders cannot because, although there are 24,000 of them, they form a 
small proportion of the Aboriginal population and an even tinier proportion of the 
total population. 
The case studies in the second half of the paper were used to explore the concept 
of regional autonomy in two different settings: the remote north, with its fairly 
discrete communities and high Indigeneity, and the rural west of New South 
Wales. The proposition was, once more, that different circumstances would result 
in different approaches to, and outcomes for, autonomy. The examples suggest 
that this is only true to a certain extent. Generally, all of the examples revealed a 
view of autonomy applying only to Indigenous people and for increased control of 
Indigenous-specific resources and services. Groups have been able to legitimise 
regions over which this should occur, but these have been Indigenous regions, 
either the ATSIC Region, or a new more culturally-based region, as in the case of 
the Tiwi. Little serious consideration has been given to including all residents in 
regional autonomy. Indeed, the proposed systems of regional representation are 
often culturally based, tending to exclude the non-Indigenous residents. 
Indigenous-specific regional autonomy leaves Indigenous people inside the ATSIC 
system with two possible options. First, greater regional autonomy is likely to 
translate to autonomy from the ATSIC centre. This is evident in the example of 
Murdi Paaki and reflects ATSIC’s own findings (see Djerrkura, Bedford & Williams 
2000). Secondly, the impact of such Indigenous-specific regional autonomy is also 
likely to be lowest where Indigenous populations are high. For where there are 
most Indigenous people (in urban areas), they are a small proportion of the 
population, levels of infrastructure and services are high, Indigenous-specific per 
capita expenditure is low, and there is a greater Indigenous reliance on 
mainstream services. That is to say, where the Indigenous population is highest, 
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there are fewer (Indigenous-specific) resources over which this form of autonomy 
might be exercised. 
Only in Torres Strait is any significant effort being made to include non-
Indigenous people in considerations of regional autonomy, though even this 
approach is in its infancy. Several factors have led to this, not least of which is 
that the formerly predominantly non-Indigenous representative body (the Shire) 
has significant Indigenous representation and is forming alliances with the 
Indigenous representative system. Of course, Torres Strait is all but autonomous 
from ATSIC, and it could be suggested that this separation represents a stage in 
the transition to full regional autonomy, and, that if other regions made a similar 
break with ATSIC, then they too would look to more inclusive forms of regional 
autonomy. However, it is more likely that Torres Strait is a special case. Its 
circumstances, such as being off-shore, being subject to the conditions of an 
international treaty (Arthur 1999), and having a tradition of being treated by 
governments as a distinct region, help legitimise its regionalisation in ways not 
easily articulated elsewhere in the country. 
It was suggested earlier that the economic aspects and indicators of regional 
autonomy might include some local control over a share of a region’s natural 
resources, and the ability to make charges and generate income. In the 
documents reviewed, it is only in Torres Strait that much consideration is given 
by Indigenous people to increasing control of the natural resources. This may be 
because, in the Northern Territory examples at least, land is already held by 
Indigenous interests. No mention is made in the New Deal that autonomy for 
Torres Strait Islanders might include their having more control of the Strait’s 
resources. Rather, the view of regional economic autonomy espoused in the New 
Deal is for Indigenous people to reduce the welfare bill to the region by increasing 
their levels of employment in the private sector; it stipulates that this would be a 
necessary condition for the Strait to become an Australian Territory. On the other 
hand, the latest indications from the Strait suggest that Islanders are not focused 
only on the control of fisheries but on their development. 
The Northern Territory government’s involvement in the Tiwi and Miwatj 
proposals indicates that they also view the economic aspects of autonomy largely 
in terms of reducing costs through the rationalisation of service delivery. Some 
interest is expressed in economic development and, in Torres Strait, a 
commitment is made to establishing an economic development task force. 
However, the general feeling is that the principal economic interest, from an 
Indigenous viewpoint, is in control over Indigenous-specific services, and not in 
control over resources, or in economic development and revenue raising. It is also 
clear from the examples and from other research (see Taylor & Hunter 1998) that 
creating development and raising revenue in these and similar regions will be 
extremely difficult. Therefore, it is not clear that the parties (government and 
Indigenous) view the content of autonomy in quite the same way. 
In addition, it is not clear that what we might consider to be the political aspects 
of autonomy (control) will necessarily lead to significant economic change. A view 
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of autonomy that is largely about the control of services is unlikely to see a 
reduction in dependency on the government, because it is government which 
funds these services. In that case, it is possible to view the form of autonomy 
proposed here by Indigenous people largely as negative autonomy: the goal is to 
increase Indigenous control of services and funding that are provided by 
government and so to decrease government intervention over decisions about 
these. That is to say, it is an autonomy aimed at reducing government 
interference, but not at separation from government support. While positive 
autonomy might have economic independence as its goal, negative autonomy may 
be a more realistic option given the economic limitations of many regions. 
One possible value of utilising the concept of negative autonomy is that it can 
help illustrate that a particular form of autonomy is possible even when there is 
continuing economic dependence. In this way it helps break down the notion that 
political autonomy is contingent on economic status. Jackson (1990) suggested 
that negative autonomy existed in nations which were dependent on international 
aid. Here we can propose that negative autonomy might exist where there is 
continuing support from the government for services and for welfare-based 
incomes under a welfare regime. In this way, it is also possible to characterise 
negative autonomy as a form of welfare autonomy (Arthur 2001b).  
 
Notes 
1. Consideration is also being given to the issue of autonomy in the Kimberley region 
(ATSIC 2000: 20) but due to lack of information at this stage this region is not 
included here. 
2. In a similar way, Articles 3 and 31 respectively of the UN’s Draft Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1995–56, give self-determination and self-government as 
rights. 
3. The corporate plan gives ATSIC’s vision as: ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples freely exercising our legal, economic, social, cultural and political rights’ 
(ATSIC 2001: 5). 
4. Fleras actually makes this point with respect to self-determination (see Fleras 1999: 
195). 
5. This is not to deny the importance of the issues of identity and of intermarriage 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in Australia (see Taylor 1997). 
6. Four seats are designated for Maori people in the New Zealand Parliament (ATSIC 
1995: 49). 
7. The same document also proposes that there should be reserved seats in State 
parliaments (see ATSIC 1995: 49). 
8. Peter Sutton first discussed the notion of bicameralism at a regional level in 1985 (see 
Sutton 1985). 
9. It is possible to also classify this as functional bicameralism since the separate house 
or chamber’s powers may be confined to certain functions such as those relating to 
land and cultural matters. 
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10. In 1897, on the advice of Douglas, the Protector for Torres Strait, the Queensland 
Government legislated separately for Torres Strait Islanders. 
11. For a discussion of definitions of ‘regions’ as these apply to regional agreements under 
the Native Title Act 1993, see Arthur (1999), Edmunds (1999: 22), and Martin (1997).  
12. Martin indicates for example that despite its internal divisions, Cape York can be 
classified as a region (1997: 2). 
13. There are 35 regions on the mainland and one over Torres Strait. All have a Regional 
Council except Torres Strait, which has a Regional Authority. 
14. A significant aspect of ATSIC expenditure relates to housing and infrastructure for 
discrete Indigenous communities. The majority of these are in the less populated 
regions. 
15. Some commentators have argued that self-determination represents negative 
autonomy (Beran 1994: 3; Jackson 1990: 6, 27). 
16. The reason for this is that whereas most Islanders were not displaced from their 
islands during the colonial period, the Kaurareg were.  
17. The members of the ICC are the elected chairs of island councils. These people 
automatically become members of the TSRA, and it is from the ICC membership that 
representatives on the PZJA are drawn. 
18. Public meetings on Thursday Island now often begin with some statement of 
recognition for the Kaurareg as traditional owners. Native title concerns have also 
stimulated Torres Shire to form a land use agreement with the Kaurareg. 
19. Like cultural bicameralism, forms of culturally modified representation are also found 
in the South Pacific, for instance in Tonga and Western Samoa. 
20. A member of the Inquiry from Queensland noted that when the Queensland 
Government was establishing the regional ICC, island councils were adamant that 
they did not wish the ICC to threaten their autonomy over affairs at the island level. 
21. The metaphor of the ‘middle-man’ derives from the fishing industry where Islanders 
feel buyers of lobsters, trochus shell, and so on, extract too high a commission. 
22. The 21 units are: the 14 Outer Island communities; the Inner Islands of Horn, Prince 
of Wales and Thursday Islands (including two suburbs of Thursday Island—TRAWQ 
and Port Kennedy); the two Island communities on the Cape (Seisia and Bamaga) plus 
Hammond Island. To chose and form the governing body of six, these 21 communities 
are formed into six sub-regions. The Outer Islands make up four of the groups, the 
Inner Islands form the fifth group and the Cape communities and Hammond Island 
are the sixth. These sub-regions are an amalgam of traditional and modern 
configurations and alliances. 
23. It should be noted that the TSRA already operates with a portfolio group. 
24. Annual workshops composed principally of mainland Torres Strait Islanders are held 
annually at different locations across the country. These are funded and organised 
through OTSIA, TSIAB and the relatively new National Secretariat of mainland Torres 
Strait Islanders  
25. Each ATSIC Region is made up of two or more electoral wards.  
26. Aboriginal society in different parts of the country is divided into sections and/or 
subsections which have attendant rules of social behaviour (see Berndt & Berndt 
1981). ‘Skin’ groupings is a colloquial term for these divisions. 
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27. The Trustees are elected under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976. 
28. It should be noted that Miwatj have investigated the issue of regional autonomy 
further since the discussion paper was produced. However, details of these 
investigations are not available at this time. 
29. Official and unofficial documents give the name of this ATSIC region as either Miwatj 
or Nhulunbuy. The name Miwatj has been used here to apply to both the ATSIC 
Region and the proposed ‘self-governing’ region. 
30. Again this ATSIC region is variously known as Murdi Paaki or Bourke. 
References 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) 1993. Review of the Operations 
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989, AGPS, Canberra. 
—— 1995. Recognition, Rights and Reform, Report to Government on Native Title Social 
Justice Matters, COA, Canberra. 
—— 1998. Review of the Operations of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
Act 1989, COA, Canberra. 
—— 1999. ‘Regional autonomy for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities’, 
Discussion Paper, ATSIC, Canberra. 
—— 2001. ATSIC Corporate Plan 2001–2004, ATSIC, Canberra. 
Altman, J.C., Arthur, W.S. and Bek, H.J. 1994. ‘Indigenous participation in commercial 
fisheries in Torres Strait: A preliminary discussion’, CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 73, 
CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
——, —— and Sanders, W. 1996. ‘Towards greater autonomy for Torres Strait: Political and 
economic dimensions’, CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 112, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
Arthur, W.S. (assisted by V. McGrath) 1990. Torres Strait Development Study, 1989, AIAS, 
Canberra. 
—— 1991. ‘Funding allocations to Aboriginal people: The Western Australia case’, CAEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 15, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
—— 1998. ‘Access to programs and services for mainland Torres Strait Islanders’, CAEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 151, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
—— 1999. ‘Towards regionalism: A regional agreement in Torres Strait’, in M. Edmunds 
(ed.), Regional Agreements, Key Issues in Australia, Vol. 2, Case Studies, AIATSIS, 
Canberra. 
—— 2001a. ‘Autonomy and identity in Torres Strait, a borderline case?’, Journal of Pacific 
History, 36 ( 2): 215–25 . 
—— 2001b. ‘Welfare dependency, welfare autonomy?’ Paper presented at the National 
Social Policy Conference, Competing Visions, 4–6 July, SPRC, UNSW. 
Australia Institute 2000. ‘Resourcing Indigenous development and self-determination, a 
scoping paper prepared for the ATSIC National Policy Office’, Strategic Development 
Team, ATSIC, Canberra. 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 220 29 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Australian Bureau of Statistics and Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, 
(ABS/CAEPR) 1997. 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey: Torres 
Strait Islanders, Queensland, Cat no. 4179.3, ABS, Canberra. 
Australia Law Reform Commission 1986. The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, 
AGPS, Canberra. 
Beran, H. 1994. A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination for a New World 
Order, Draft ms, Department of Philosophy, University of Wollongong. 
Berndt, R.M. and Berndt, C.H. 1981. The World of the First Australians, Landsdowne Press, 
London. 
Brownlie, I. 1992. Treaties and Indigenous Peoples, The Robb Lectures 1991, F.M. 
Brookfield (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Coombs, H.C. 1993. Issues in Dispute: Aborigines Working for Autonomy, NARU, ANU, 
Darwin. 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) 2000. Reconciliation: Australia’s Challenge, 
Final Report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation to the Prime Minister and the 
Commonwealth Parliament, CAR, Canberra. 
Courchene, T.J. 1993. ‘Aboriginal self-government in Canada’, Occasional Lecture Series, 
Australian Senate, April 1993, Canberra. 
Craig, D. and Freeland, S. 1999. ‘Indigenous governance by the Inuit of Greenland and the 
Sami of Scandinavia’, Discussion Paper No. 8, Australian Research Council 
Collaborative Research Project and National Native Title Tribunal, UNSW, Sydney and 
Murdoch University, Perth. 
Crocker, L. 1980. Positive Liberty: An Essay in Normative Political Philosophy, Melbourne 
International Philosophy Series, Vol. 7, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. 
Davis, R. 1998. Epochal Bodies and Gendered Time: Engagement and Transformation in 
Saibaian Masculinity, PhD thesis, ANU, Canberra. 
Djerrkura, G., Bedford, E. and Williams, D. 2000. Report on Greater Regional Autonomy, 
ATSIC, Canberra. 
Dworkin, G. 1988. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Edmunds, M. 1999. ‘Key issues for the development of regional agreements: An overview’, 
in Edmunds, M. (ed.), Regional Agreements: Key Issues in Australia, Vol. 2, Case 
Studies, AIATSIS, Canberra. 
Fisk, E.K. 1974. Socio-Economic Conditions in Torres Strait, Vol. 6, Policy Options in Torres 
Strait, RSPS, ANU, Canberra. 
Fleras, A. 1999. ‘Politicising indigeneity: Ethno-politics in white settler domains’, in P. 
Havemann (ed.), Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
—— and Elliott, J.L. 1992. The ‘Nations Within’: Aboriginal–State Relations in Canada, the 
United States, and New Zealand, Oxford University Press, Ontario. 
Fletcher, C. 1992. ‘“Altered states?” Federalism sovereignty and self-government’, 
Federalism Discussion Paper No. 22, RSSS, ANU, Canberra. 
Galipeau, C. 1994. Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
30 ARTHUR 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Ghai, Y. 2000. ‘Ethnicity and autonomy: A framework for analysis’, in Y. Ghai (ed.), 
Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
—— and Regan, A. 2000. ‘Bougainville and the dialectics of ethnicity, autonomy and 
separation’, in Y. Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in 
Multi-Ethnic States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Hannum, H. and Lillich R.B. 1981. ‘The concept of autonomy in international law’, in Y. 
Dinstein (ed.), Models of Autonomy, Transaction Books, London. 
Hansard 1996. House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Affairs: Greater Autonomy for Torres Strait Islanders, Records of 
Formal Discussions, Injinoo, 24 October 1996. 
Herron, J. (Senator) 1996. Ninth Annual Joe and Dame Enid Lyons Memorial Lecture, 
University House, ANU, Canberra. 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs (HORSCATSIA) 1997. Torres Strait Islanders: A New Deal, Report on Greater 
Autonomy for Torres Strait Islanders, HORSCATSIA, Canberra. 
Jackson, R.H. 1990. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third 
World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Jonas, W. 2000. Social Justice Report 2000, HREOC, Sydney. 
Lemon, A. 1993 ‘Political and security issues of small island states’, in G.L. Douglas, D. 
Drakakis-Smith and J. Schembri (eds), The Development Process in Small Island 
States, Routledge, London. 
Liberal Party, 1996. ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs Policy’ (pre-election 
statement). 
MacLeod, G. 1998. ‘In what sense a region? Place, hybridity, symbolic shape, and 
institutional formation in (post-)modern Scotland’, Political Geography, 17 (7): 833–63. 
Martin, D.F. 1997. ‘Regional agreements and localism: A case study from Cape York 
Peninsula’, CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 146, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
—— 2001. ‘Is welfare dependency “welfare poison”? An assessment of Noel Pearson’s 
proposals for Aboriginal welfare reform’, CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 213, CAEPR, 
ANU, Canberra. 
—— and Finlayson, J.D. 1996. ‘Linking accountability and self-determination in Aboriginal 
organisations’, CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 116, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
Murdi Paaki n.d. ‘Decision-making at the community level’, A paper prepared by the Murdi 
Paaki ATSIC Regional Council. 
Northern Territory of Australia (NTA) 2001. ‘Tiwi Islands Local Government Constitution’, 
Draft, Northern Territory Government Gazette, 12 July 2001. 
Northern Territory Government (NTG) 1999. ‘A possible model for a “Miwatj Regional 
Government”, prepared as a discussion document’, NTG, Darwin. 
Office of Evaluation and Audit 2001. Evaluation of the Torres Strait Regional Authority, 
ATSIC, Canberra. 
Parker, R. 1971. ‘Economics before politics: A colonial phantasy’, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, 17 (2): 202–14. 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 220 31 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Poynton, P. 1996. ‘Dream lovers: Indigenous peoples and the inalienable right to self-
determination’, in R. Howitt, J. Connell and P. Hirsch (eds.), Resources, Nations and 
Indigenous Peoples: Case Studies from Australasia, Melanesia and Southeast Asia, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
Rowse, T. (forthcoming) The Rise of the Indigenous Sector, unpublished ms. 
Sanders, W. 1994. ‘Reshaping governance in Torres Strait: The Torres Strait Regional 
Authority and beyond’, CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 74, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
—— 2000. ‘Torres Strait governance structures and the centenary of Australian federation: 
A missed opportunity?’ Australian Journal of Public Administration, 59 (3): 22–33. 
—— and Arthur, W.S. 2001. ‘Autonomy rights in Torres Strait: From whom, for whom, for 
or over what?’ CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 215, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
Saunders, C. 2000. ‘The implications of federalism for Indigenous Australians’, in Y. Ghai, 
(ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Smith, D.E. 1992. ‘An analysis of the Aboriginal component of Commonwealth fiscal flows 
to the Northern Territory’, CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 29, CAEPR, ANU, Canberra. 
Sohn, L.B. 1988. ‘Models of autonomy within the United Nations framework’, in Y. Dinstein 
(ed.), Models of Autonomy, Transaction Books, London. 
Stavenhagen, R. 1994. ‘Indigenous rights: Some conceptual problems’, in W. Assies and 
A.J. Hoekama, (eds), Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with Self-Government: 
Proceedings of the Seminar on Arrangements for Self-Determination by Indigenous 
Peoples within National States, International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs 
and University of Amsterdam, Copenhagen. 
Sutton, P. 1985. ‘Suggestions for a bicameral system’, Anthropological Forum, 5 (3): 395–9. 
Taylor, J. 1997. ‘The contemporary demography of Indigenous Australians’, Journal of the 
Australian Population Association, 14 (1): 77–113. 
—— and Hunter, B. 1998. The Job Still Ahead: Economic Costs of Continuing Indigenous 
Employment Disparity, Office of Public Affairs, ATSIC, Canberra. 
Tiwi Islands Regional Coordinating Committee (TIRCC) 2000. Tiwi Regional Governance: A 
Proposal for a New Scheme of Governance for the Tiwi Islands, Unpublished report 
prepared with the assistance of J. G. Menham and C. Marshall, April 2000. 
Tonkinson, R. and Howard, M. (eds), 1990. Going it Alone: Prospects for Aboriginal 
Autonomy, Essays in Honour of Ronald and Catherine Berndt, AIATSIS, Canberra. 
Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) 1999. Annual Report 1998–1999, TSRA, Thursday 
Island. 
Waia, T. 2001. ‘Torres Strait Territory Government’, Unpublished paper presented at the 
11th Torres Strait Islander Seminar/Workshop, 15–19 October 2001, Canberra. 
Watts, R.L. 2000. ‘Federalism and diversity in Canada’, in Y. Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and 
Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 

 C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research 
Publications 
For information on earlier CAEPR Discussion Papers and Research Monographs please contact: 
Publication Sale, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The Australian National University, Canberra, 
ACT, 0200, Telephone: 02–6125 8211, Facsimile: 02–6125 2789. Information on CAEPR, and abstracts or 
summaries of all CAEPR print publications and those published electronically, can be found at the following 
WWW address: http://online.anu.edu.au/caepr/ 
MONOGRAPH SERIES 
5. The Relative Economic Status of Indigenous Australians, 1986–91, J. Taylor, 1993. 
6. Regional Change in the Economic Status of Indigenous Australians, 1986–91, 
J. Taylor, 1993. 
7. Mabo and Native Title: Origins and Institutional Implications, W. Sanders (ed.), 1994. 
8. The Housing Need of Indigenous Australians, 1991, R. Jones, 1994. 
9. Indigenous Australians in the Economy: Abstracts of Research, 1993–94, L.M. Roach 
and H.J. Bek, 1995. 
10. Native Title: Emerging Issues for Research, Policy and Practice, J. Finlayson and 
D.E. Smith (eds), 1995.  
11. The 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey: Findings and Future 
Prospects, J.C. Altman and J. Taylor (eds), 1996. 
12. Fighting Over Country: Anthropological Perspectives, D.E. Smith and J.D. Finlayson 
(eds), 1997. 
13. Connections in Native Title: Genealogies, Kinship and Groups, J.D. Finlayson, 
B. Rigsby and H.J. Bek (eds), 1999. 
14. Land Rights at Risk? Evaluations of the Reeves Report, J.C. Altman, F. Morphy and 
T. Rowse (eds), 1999. 
15. Unemployment Payments, the Activity Test and Indigenous Australians: 
Understanding Breach Rates, W. Sanders, 1999. 
16. Why Only One in Three? The Complex Reasons for Low Indigenous School Retention, 
R.G. Schwab, 1999. 
17. Indigenous Families and the Welfare System: Two Community Case Studies, 
D.E. Smith (ed.), 1999. 
18. Ngukurr at the Millennium: A Baseline Profile for Social Impact Planning in South East 
Arnhem Land, J. Taylor, J. Bern and K.A. Senior, 2000. 
19. Aboriginal Nutrition and the Nyirranggulung Health Strategy in Jawoyn Country, 
J. Taylor and N. Westbury, 2000. 
20. The Indigenous Welfare Economy and the CDEP Scheme, F. Morphy and 
W. Sanders (eds), 2001. 
 C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
RECENT DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES  
193/2000 The economic status of Indigenous Australians, J.C. Altman. 
194/2000 Transformations of the Indigenous population: Recent and future trends, 
J. Taylor. 
195/2000 The effects of the CDEP scheme on the economic status of Indigenous 
Australians: Some analyses using the 1996 Census, J.C. Altman and 
M.C. Gray. 
196/2000 Towards an index of relative Indigenous socioeconomic disadvantage, 
M.C. Gray and A.J. Auld. 
197/2000 Estimating Indigenous housing need for public funding allocation: A multi-
measure approach, M. Neutze, W. Sanders and R. Jones. 
198/2000 Participation and representation in ATSIC elections: A ten-year 
perspective, W. Sanders, J. Taylor and K. Ross. 
199/2000 Location and socioeconomic status: Torres Strait Islanders, 1996, 
W.S. Arthur. 
200/2000 Industrial relations in workplaces employing Indigenous Australians, 
B.H. Hunter and A.E. Hawke. 
201/2000 A comparative analysis of the industrial relations experiences of 
Indigenous and other Australian workers, B.H. Hunter and A.E. Hawke. 
202/2000 The reform agenda for vocational education and training: Implications for 
Indigenous Australians, S. Campbell. 
203/2000 Surveying mobile populations: Lessons from recent longitudinal surveys of 
Indigenous Australians, B.H. Hunter and D.E. Smith. 
204/2000 Social exclusion, social capital, and Indigenous Australians: Measuring the 
social costs of unemployment, B.H. Hunter. 
205/2000 Job-searching and careers: Young Torres Strait Islanders, 1999, 
W.S. Arthur and J. David-Petero. 
206/2000 Career aspirations and orientation to work: Young Torres Strait Islanders, 
1999, W.S. Arthur and J. David-Petero. 
207/2000 Education, training and careers: Young Torres Strait Islanders, 1999, 
W.S. Arthur and J. David-Petero. 
208/2000 A case study of the Bungala CDEP: Economic and social impacts, 
M.C. Gray and E. Thacker. 
209/2000 The CDEP in town and country Arnhem Land: Bawinanga Aboriginal 
Corporation, J.C. Altman and V. Johnson. 
210/2000 ‘If it wasn’t for CDEP’: A case study of Worn Gundidj CDEP, Victoria, 
R. Madden. 
211/2001 Anangu population dynamics and future growth in Uluru-Kata Tjuta 
National Park, J. Taylor. 
212/2001 Indigenous Australians and the rules of the social security system: 
Universalism, appropriateness and justice, W. Sanders. 
 C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
213/2001 Is welfare dependency ‘welfare poison’? An assessment of Noel Pearson’s 
proposals for Aboriginal welfare reform, D.F. Martin. 
214/2001 Indigenous data from the ABS Labour Force Survey: What can they tell 
us?  J. Taylor and B.H. Hunter. 
215/2001 Autonomy rights in Torres Strait: From whom, for whom, for or over what? 
W.G. Sanders and W.S. Arthur. 
216/2001 Indigenous families and the welfare system: The Kuranda community 
case study, Stage Two, R. Henry and A. Daly. 
217/2001 Indigenous families and the welfare system: The Yuendumu community 
case study, Stage Two, Y. Musharbash. 
218/2001 Giving credit where it’s due: The delivery of banking and financial services 
to Indigenous Australians in rural and remote areas, S. McDonnell and 
N. Westbury. 
219/2001 Implications of developments in telecommunications for Indigenous people 
in remote and rural Australia, A. Daly 
220/2001 Indigenous autonomy in Australia: Some concepts, issues and examples, 
W.S. Arthur 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Available at no cost on WWW at http://online.anu.edu.au/caepr/ 
1/1999 Three nations, not one: Indigenous and other Australian poverty, 
B.H. Hunter. 
2/1999 Further investigations into Indigenous labour supply: What discourages 
discouraged workers? B.H. Hunter and M.C. Gray. 
3/1999 Dealing with alcohol in Alice Springs: An assessment of policy options and 
recommendations for action, M. Brady and D.F. Martin. 
4/1999 Aboriginal people in the Kakadu region: Social indicators for impact 
assessment, J. Taylor. 
5/1999 Reforming the Northern Territory Land Rights Act’s financial framework 
into a more logical and more workable model, J.C. Altman and 
D.P. Pollack. 
6/2000 Governance and service delivery for remote Aboriginal communities in the 
Northern Territory: Challenges and opportunities, N. Westbury and 
W. Sanders. 
7/2000 What’s in it for Koories? Barwon Darling Alliance Credit Union and the 
delivery of financial and banking services in north-west New South Wales, 
N. Westbury. 
8/2000 The relative social and economic status of Indigenous people in Bourke, 
Brewarrina and Walgett, K. Ross and J. Taylor. 
9/2001 Indigenous communities and business: Three perspectives, 1998- 2000, 
J.C. Altman 
 
